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The success of populist and Eurosceptic parties was one of the key narratives to emerge from the
European Parliament elections in May. Ruth Wodak writes on the platforms which underpin these
parties, noting that there is no one-size-fits-all explanation for why parties have gained ground in
certain countries. Nevertheless she argues that it is difficult to predict where such a diverse range of
movements will lead.
The results of the elections to the European Parliament in May have caused great concern in the
various national governments of European Union member states, as well as in the European
organisations: although expected by opinion makers and predicted by opinion polls, it was
nevertheless surprising that the French extreme right-wing populist party the Front National (FN) won first place in
France (with just under 24.9 per cent) and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) first place in the UK (with
27.5 per cent).
The electoral success of these two Eurosceptic, nationalistic/chauvinistic and xenophobic parties dominated media
reactions across Europe and beyond, leading many politicians and journalists to proclaim the foreseeable end of the
European Union. In the midst of such outcries, other results were neglected and contradictory tendencies
overlooked.
For example, the Austrian extreme right-wing populist party Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) won fewer votes than
expected and took third place (with around 20 per cent); in Italy Matteo Renzi’s Democratic Party(which belongs to
the Party of European Socialists) almost doubled its seats whereas the extreme right lost more than 50 per cent of
theirs. In Sweden, the Socialists won the election and the governing conservative party lost more than 5 per cent; in
Greece, the opposition left-wing Syriza gained over 22 per cent on its vote share from 2009. In Hungary, on the
other hand, the extreme right-wing party Jobbikreceived just under 14.7 per cent.
Making sense of the success of populist parties
Obviously, we are dealing with contradictory tendencies across Europe that are not easily explained by North-South
or East-West cleavages. It is also obvious that the economic crisis did not influence the elections to similar effects
across Europe: Austria and Denmark belong to the richest countries of the world and have some of the most
successful right-wing populist parties. In these cases, the Austrian chauvinism and Danish protectionism of their
social welfare state are combined with xenophobic, anti-Semitic, and anti-Muslim beliefs and strong scepticism
towards the European Union. In other EU member states, however, the financial crisis certainly supported the
emergence or re-emergence of parties similar to Neo-Nazi and fascist organisations (such as Golden Dawnin
Greece and Jobbik in Hungary) who both also employ physical violence against migrants, Jews, and Roma. The
overall election was ultimately won by the European People’s Party, albeit with massive losses, and the Party of
European Socialists took second place.
Speculations about the reasons for such developments are manifold – they range from a purported broad
disillusionment with politics per se andblaming governing parties for the global financial crisis, to discontentment
with austerity politics and the growing gap between rich and poor. For most parties, the fear of migrants and asylum-
seekers became a hegemonic agenda as well as a forceful argument for the necessity to protect the “Christian
Occident” as a constitutive part of European identity. In other cases, old traditional anti-Semitic, racist and anti-
Ziganist prejudices were functionalised in order to construct scapegoats wherever and whenever needed.
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Furthermore, new media-savvy charismatic leaders
such as Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage or the FPÖ’s HC
Strache and their rhetoric are recognised as (at least a
partial) cause of such success. And, finally, nationalistic
oppositional interests were frequently played against
governing parties and their politics – hence transforming
the European elections into national elections. In short:
there is no one explanation and no clear uni-directional
development to be identified in such complex and
contradictory results. Following the Dutch sociologist
Dick Pels, it would be dangerous and wrong to regard
modern populism as void of serious content or to reduce
the new right-wing populism to a “frivolity of form, pose
and style” and thus to downplay its outreach, its
messages and resonance. Pels claims that “it is
precisely through its dynamic mix of substance and
style that populist politics has gained an electoral lead
position in current media democracy”.
Extreme right-wing populist parties are united in their endorsement of a chauvinist, nativist view of ‘the people’, as
well as by creating specific chauvinistic identity myths which idealise and rewrite history, and an anti-élistist,
revisionist and anti-intellectual stance combined with strong Euroscepticism. Moreover, one can observe a tendency
to favour plebiscitarian methods and to downplay representative democracy while proclaiming the search for “true
democracy” and denouncing “formalistic democracy”. Democracy should be reduced, such parties argue, to the
majority rule of “the people”. By triggering such debates, populism might – as political scientist Ernesto Laclau
claims – possibly play a crucial role by re-politicising democracy. Of course, such parties struggle to define
themselves in terms of who belongs to the respective “people” and who does not. Belonging usually implies nativist
criteria rather than any kind of legal citizenship. In this way, the “real Austrians, Hungarians, British or Dutch” are
juxtaposed to “Others” (foreigners, non-Christians).
However, the parties differ significantly in terms of their specific foci and historical as well as socio-political contexts:
some parties gain support via an ambivalent relationship with fascistandNazi pasts (e.g. in Austria, Hungary, Italy,
Romania and France); others focus primarily on a perceived threat from Islam (e.g. in the Netherlands, Denmark,
Poland, Sweden and Switzerland); some parties restrict their propaganda to a perceived danger to their national
identities from ethnic minorities (e.g. in Hungary, Greece, Italy and the UK); and others primarily endorse a
traditional Christian (fundamentalist) conservative-reactionary agenda (e.g. in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine
and Russia). Consequently, there is no one-size-fits-all explanation for this complex phenomenon.
Europe’s future
Predicting future developments as a consequence of the EU elections 2014 is, of course, difficult. The much-
discussed attempt to form a transnational extreme right-wing Populist Party seems doomed to fail: the overtly
nationalistic orientation of such movements does not lend itself to any transnational or even cosmopolitan alliance.
The above-mentioned different historical traditions and agenda also seem to prohibit any easy coalition or alliance
despite the existence of a common enemy – the European Union.
On the other hand, a continuous normalisation of exclusionary agenda can be observed: instead of positioning
oneself clearly against agendas such as immigration restrictions, historical revisionism or anti-feminism, some
mainstream parties in government accommodate right-wing populist agendas and integrate these into their
programmes for fear of losing even more voters. In this way, they arguably opt for the wrong strategy as they will
certainly not convince more liberal voters, but instead lose them. Nor will they win back any voters they have already
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lost to the right-wing populist parties. Such a dynamic was clearly observed in Austria, for example, where many
proposals of the FPÖ from 1992/1993 (for immigration restrictions and other policies), which were vehemently
opposed by the governments in office during the 1990s, have since been implemented by the governing Grand
Coalition.
It is also difficult to predict the consequence of the fact that European citizens were able to ‘elect’ the President of the
Commission and the European Parliament for the first time. Many controversies among heads of state indicate that
it seems to be very difficult to accept the vote of the European citizens and to have lost the privilege of negotiating
important functions, strategies, and positions behind closed doors. These changes might lead to more transparency
of decision-making processes and thus, to a revival of interest in European political processes.
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